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Abstract
This paper proposes and tests empirically a model of optimal job search using
novel data on job seeking strategies of participants in the labor market for MBA
graduates. Theoretically and empirically I find that the breadth of search that
workers conduct depends on their ability, outside option, and fit with available
jobs, as well as on the exogenous job application cost and the ex-ante probability
of applications resulting in offers. These results illustrate the formation of the
supply of human capital available to hiring companies, which drives the efficiency
of matching between workers and firms and ultimately determines productivity.
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1 Introduction
An important driver of firm productivity is hiring talented workers whose skills match the
needs of the firm. While there exist significant theoretical work regarding matching in the
labor market, spearheaded by the seminal contributions of Spence (1973) and Jovanovic
(1979), this work assumes that workers either get matched with firms at random and
the quality of the match is revealed over time (as in Jovanovic (1979)), or they use a
directed search approach by targeting firms that offer higher wages (Rogerson, Shimer,
& Wright (2005)). These models are meant to capture macroeconomic phenomena such
as the dynamics of unemployment and wages, but do not seek to explain the formation
of the pool of human capital available to each firm.
The actual search strategies used by workers, however, determine the supply of hu-
man capital that individual firms face when making hiring decisions. Therefore, job
candidates’ search choices drive the efficiency of the actual matches between firms and
workers and ultimately influence firm productivity, but this search process is yet to be
understood. This paper addresses this gap in the literature by proposing and testing
empirically a simple model of allocation of effort during workers’ search for jobs, with
the goal of understanding the determinants of the supply of talent available to firms. I
use a novel data set that contains detailed information about the search strategies and
labor market outcomes of more than 2,000 MBA graduates from a top U.S. business
school recruited by globally-known companies.
Theoretically I show that candidates competing for employment increase their job
search effort if the marginal cost of effort is lower, the likelihood that firms will hire
increases, their outside option is worse, the job sought is more valuable, or if their ability
is lower. Candidates apply to positions for which they are better qualified, while higher
ability types are more likely to choose to participate in contests for higher paying jobs.
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These predictions are confirmed empirically. I find that candidates apply to more
positions when they do not have to spend valuable points to bid to be considered for
these jobs, and, conditional on having an offer from a previous summer or full-time
employer, they apply to fewer positions if the probability of firms’ hiring is lower, which
occurs during the 2008-2009 economic recession. Candidates with a more valuable outside
option, namely, those that have an offer from a prior employer, are more focused in their
search and apply to fewer positions, concentrated in fewer industries. Higher ability
candidates, as measured by their GPA, GMAT score, the prestige of the undergraduate
school they attended, or the expertise in the industry they apply to, are also more focused
in their search compared to lower ability individuals. Job seekers that have taken more
classes or have been involved in more extracurricular activities related to a particular
industry (e.g., Finance or Technology) are more likely than other individuals in the
sample to apply to jobs in that industry. Moreover, I observe that contests for higher-
paying jobs attract more candidates than lower-paying jobs, and the average ability
(measured by the GPA or GMAT score) of these candidates is higher. There also exist
a gender effect, with men being more likely to compete in contests for the better paid
positions.
While the goal of this paper is to study the individual-level search behavior of job
applicants, in a companion paper (Kuhnen (2009)) I focus on a related question, namely,
how firms screen and compete for workers, once the pool of human capital they can hire
from is formed.
The model of job search that I propose here uses the tournament theory framework
(Lazear & Rosen (1981)). Although very simple, it makes several predictions that are
difficult to obtain in other settings. For instance, the model predicts that effort levels
are different across candidates. In models of asymmetric contests where outside options
of the players are not heterogeneous (e.g.,, Baik (1994)), the result is that all contestants
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put in the same level of effort, even if they may have different abilities, and this effect
seems to run contrary to what I document job candidates actually do in the data. Also, in
the labor economics literature on job market search and unemployment (e.g., Pissarides
(2000)) it is difficult to obtain the theoretical prediction that workers search with higher
intensity in bad economic times. However, as Shimer (2004) shows, the empirical evidence
indicates that workers search for jobs harder (specifically, through more channels) during
recessions. Shimer (2004) proposes a general equilibrium model of unemployment where
workers can send simultaneously many job applications and finds that when the cost
of applying is low, a worker who has at least an 80% chance of getting a job responds
to an adverse macroeconomic shock by increasing his search intensity. The intuition
behind this result is that, since a worker will only accept one job offer even if many are
received, the marginal benefit of sending an additional application is higher in bad times,
when the worker may have zero offers, than in good times, when he may have several
offers already. The model I present here has a similar intuition, which is that because
job candidates’ outside options are less valuable in bad economic times, they will search
more to seek employment. While this result is not obtained in a general equilibrium
context, my simple framework also allows us to study the influence of other parameters
on the search behavior of workers, namely the cost of search and the heterogeneity in
abilities or in the values that candidates assign to specific jobs.
The model makes the simplifying assumption that candidates apply to just one job
and decide how much effort to exert during the application process. The intuition of the
results obtained here would carry in a more complicated framework where a job applicant
must determine which n jobs to apply to out of N openings, and can only take one offer
from a set of possibly multiple offers (e.g. the one with the highest wage, or best fit or
highest overall utility for that person). Solving for the optimal set of jobs one should
apply to is not trivial when applications are costly, as this problem requires maximizing
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a sub-modular function of finite sets. For simple specifications of the job payoff and
application cost function, Chade & Smith (2006) propose a greedy algorithm that finds
the optimal set of opportunities a candidate should pursue.1 The resulting comparative
statics their model would yield in the context of job search are two-fold: if the application
costs are higher, candidates will apply to fewer jobs, and if the probability of getting an
offer for each job opening increases (perhaps because the employers become keener to fill
vacancies because the economic conditions are better and production is more valuable),
then applicants are more “aggressive”, in the sense that they are more likely to apply to
long-shot jobs (i.e. those positions that are highly desirable but difficult to get). Similar
predictions, though, are also obtained in my simplified framework where the decision is
about how much effort candidates choose to put in the recruiting process, for instance
either by improving their resume or by networking with representatives of the firm they
are interested in.
Related to this paper, there exists a small but growing literature focused on labor
market outcomes of MBA students. Oyer (2008) finds that more MBA students get
jobs in investment banking upon graduation if the stock market performs better during
those individuals’ graduate school years, and the lifetime wages of students that go into
investment banking directly after business school are significantly greater than those of
students who do not. Sapienza, Maestripieri, & Zingales (2009) find that MBA students
high in testosterone and low in risk aversion are more likely to work in higher risk finance
jobs after graduation. Kaniel, Massey, & Robinson (2009) find that optimistic MBA
students tend to place less weight on the importance of landing a job after graduation,
but despite this, they are more likely to hold summer internships by the spring of their
first year, and receive full-time job offers faster than their peers. These papers, however,
1The behavior studied in Chade & Smith (2006) is the decision regarding to which colleges a high
school student should apply.
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focus on career outcomes and do not address individual-level job search strategies.
2 A simple model of job search
I will assume that two individuals seek employment and compete for the same job in a
one-shot game. Let λ be the probability that a job offer will be made to either of the
candidates, with higher values of this parameter indicating better economic conditions
(e.g., a lower unemployment rate) at the time when the candidates apply for the job. If
individual i ∈ {1, 2} does not get employed he will have an outside option with utility
vi. This outside option captures, for instance, the value of any potential job offers that
the candidate may get at a later time, or the value of an existing employment offer that
the candidate already has obtained.
The two candidates differ in their ability, which can be broadly interpreted as their
human capital, either general or specific to the job they apply to. Let θ > 1 capture this
ability difference, and without loss of generality, let agent 1 be the more able candidate.
Then θ indicates how much more able agent 1 is relative to agent 2. Agents are also
heterogeneous with regard to the amount of utility they would get if they got the job
offer. Let the utility agent i of being employed in this particular position be given by vi.
I assume that vi − vi > 0, that is, agents prefer to be employed rather than take their
outside option.
Each agent i chooses how much effort ei to exert during the job application process in
order to increase his chance of being hired. For instance, a candidate can spend more time
polishing his resume, networking with employees from the recruiting firm, or studying
topics that may be covered in the job interview. Effort is costly and causes the agent
disutility equal to cei, where c > 0. As in other models of contests with asymmetric
players (e.g., Baik (1994) and Brown (2008)), the ability difference θ as well as the effort
5
exerted will influence the probability of “winning”(in this case, of obtaining the job offer).
Conditional on the exogenous hiring probability λ, the probability that agent 1 gets the
job offer is
p1 =
θe1
θe1 + e2
, (1)
and the probability that agent 2 gets the offer is
p2 = 1− p1 =
e2
θe1 + e2
. (2)
The two agents will simultaneously set the effort spent in the recruiting process.
Agent i therefore solves the following problem:
max
ei
Πi = λp1v1 + (1− λp1)v1 − ce1 (3)
It is easy to show that the resulting Nash equilibrium is characterized by the following
effort levels:
e∗
1
=
λθ(v2 − v2)
c
(
θ +
v2−v2
v1−v1
)2 (4)
and
e∗
2
=
(
v2 − v2
v1 − v1
)
λθ(v2 − v2)
c
(
θ +
v2−v2
v1−v1
)2 (5)
From equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) we obtain the following comparative statics
results:
de∗i
dc
< 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (6)
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de∗i
dλ
> 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (7)
de∗i
d(vi − vi)
> 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (8)
de∗i
dθ
< 0 ⇐⇒ v2 − v2 < θ(v1 − v1), ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (9)
and we also have that
e2 − e1 = e1
(
v2 − v2
v1 − v1
− 1
)
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (10)
The implications of the comparative statics in (6)—(8) are straightforward and in-
tuitive: all else equal, a candidate will put more effort in his job application process if
the cost of applying is lower, if the exogenous probability that hiring will in fact occur is
higher, or if the utility from getting the job, relative to being left with the outside option,
is higher.
The result given by (9) is a generalization of that obtained in prior models of contests
with asymmetric players such as Baik (1994), where both agents assign a value of 0 to
their outside option, and they have the same value for being employed (i.e., v1 = v2 = 0
and v1 = v2 = V > 0). Under these simplifying assumptions, both agents put less effort
in the contest when the difference in ability between the two players is larger. The result
is intuitive: if the better agent is much more able that the other player, he does not need
to put in much effort to win the contest. The lower ability player understands that he
stands a low chance of winning because he is far less able that the other person, and
therefore will also exert a low effort level.
When there is heterogeneity in outside options and the values that players assign to
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the job, as it is the case in my setup, equilibrium effort levels are decreasing in the ability
difference θ if and only if the low ability candidate is not too “desperate” for the job
relative to the other agent (i.e., when v2 − v2 < θ(v1 − v1)).
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Further, equation (10) indicates that if the lower ability agent 2 needs the job more
than the higher ability agent 1 (i.e., if v2 − v2 > v1 − v1), then he will in fact work
harder during the recruiting process than agent 1. This will happen, for instance, when
the outside option v2 of the low ability candidate is particularly bad. The empirical evi-
dence in Hines, Hoynes, & Krueger (2002) and Oreopoulos, von Wachter, & Heisz (2006)
suggests this is the case, at least during economic recessions, as lower ability workers
are less able to secure employment. Kuhnen (2009) shows that, unconditionally, lower
ability individuals end up being employed in lower paying jobs. Hence, it is reasonable
to assume that lower types benefit from getting the job (instead of taking the outside
option) more than higher types.
This simple framework therefore yields the following testable predictions:
Proposition 1 All else equal, a job candidate will put more effort into the recruiting
process when the marginal cost c of applying is lower, his value for the job vi is higher,
his outside option vi is lower, or the unconditional probability λ that hiring will occur is
higher. The highest effort will be exerted by the candidate who needs the job more, i.e.,
who has the highest value of vi − vi.
Once it is known what the equilibrium effort levels are given the players’ valuations
vi, i ∈ {1, 2}, of a particular job and the talent difference θ, it is natural to inquire which
jobs individuals will choose to compete for.3 Let Π∗
1
(θ, v1, v2) be the equilibrium value of
2Simple algebra shows that
de∗
1
dθ
= λ
c
(v2 − v2)
v2−v2
v1−v1
−θ
“
θ+
v2−v2
v1−v1
”
3 and
de∗
2
dθ
=
v2−v2
v1−v1
de∗
2
dθ
.
3Here I am making the simplifying assumption that a player outside option vi is the same no matter
which job he will choose to apply for.
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profits realized by agent 1 if he chooses to apply for a job for which he is θ times more
able than the competition, and from which he and the competition would get utility v1
and v2, respectively. It can be shown that for all positive values of θ and of v1 − v1:
dΠ∗
1
dv1
> 0 and
dΠ∗
1
dθ
> 0 (11)
Therefore, we have the following additional prediction:
Proposition 2 Candidates will choose to compete for jobs for which they are relatively
more qualified (i.e., for which they have higher θ) and from which they derive higher utility
(i.e., jobs that offer them a higher vi), keeping all other parameters and the competitors
the same across jobs.
3 Data
The data were obtained from the career management office at a top business school in the
U.S. and provide detailed information about the demographics (age, gender, country of
residence, undergraduate degree), work experience, grades, on-campus club memberships,
job applications and job offers of students enrolled in the two-year full-time MBA program
at this institution. For each student in the class of 2007, 2008 and 2009 (about 500 per
class) the data set contains the internship and full-time jobs they applied to during the
on-campus recruiting season, when employers set up interviews on the premises of the
business school according to a pre-announced schedule. As the data were obtained in
June 2009, for class of 2010 candidates I only know information about their internship
recruiting. Moreover, for each student in the class of 2007, 2008 and 2009 the data set
contains all the internship and full-time offers they obtained, from all firms and not just
those that conducted their recruiting on campus. Finally, for the class of 2006 I only
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know the job offers received by students, but do not know the complete set of firms they
applied to. Since the paper is focused on job search strategies I will limit the analysis
to data from the cohorts graduating in 2007 through 2010, since for those individuals I
know their job application history.
Students can apply to obtain an interview slot during on-campus recruiting in two
stages. In the first stage, referred to as “closed”, they can submit resumes to companies
that will offer on-campus recruiting. Employers then select whom to invite for interviews
based on students’ resumes only. This process is costless to students. In a second stage,
called the “open” or “bidding” system, students can bid a limited number of points (out
of an annual endowment of 800 points) to obtain an interview slot. Therefore, in this
second stage obtaining an interview with a desired employer is costly to the student.
The data set contains all the bids that each student placed for interview slots for either
internships or full-time jobs, as well as information whether or not the bids were successful
(i.e., higher or equal to the clearing bid for that contest). On-campus recruiting for full-
time positions occurs at the beginning of the students’ second year in the MBA program,
between September and December. On-campus recruiting for summer internships occurs
during the January-March period of the students’ first year in the MBA program. For
both types of positions recruiting occurs in multiple rounds, each of them lasting one
week, with each company recruiting in one round only. Bidding takes place sequentially,
first for interviews with companies in the first round (i.e., those present on campus during
the first week of interviews), and then for companies in each of the subsequent rounds.
Before students send in any applications or bid any points, they know the full on-campus
recruiting schedule, that is, which companies will be interviewing in each round, and how
many closed and open slots they have available.
I complement these data with a measure of employer prestige, using the Fortune MBA
100 annual rankings, which are typically published in May. If a firm is ranked in the
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top 100 according to these surveys, then I will refer to it a prestigious employer.4 I also
collect data on the prestige of the undergraduate institution that each student attended,
using the word-wide college ranking compiled by QS Top Universities in 2008.5 For each
college that the individuals in my sample went to I determine whether it is a top 100
school using these rankings.
4 Results
4.1 Choosing effort during job search: Tests of Proposition 1
When the cost of effort is lower, all else equal, more effort is expended (
de∗
i
dc
<
0).
Given the structure of the on-campus recruiting process that the individuals in the
sample face, this prediction is easily testable. Students can initially send applications at
no cost to companies that have interview slots on campus, and the companies will pick
those candidates they like best to populate the “closed” slots (i.e., closed to bidding).
After the closed slots are filled up, students are informed whether or not they were
successful at getting interviews and can then bid costly points to get “open” interview
slots (i.e., open to bidding). Therefore, the model predicts that students should apply
to more positions during the closed and costless stage than during the open and costly
stage. Figure 1 presents evidence that this is indeed the case, for every cohort in my
sample (i.e., class of 2007 through class of 2010) and for both internship and full-time job
searches. Across all cohorts, the average number of internship applications submitted by
students is 13.78 in the closed (costless) stage, and 4.18 in the open (costly) stage. The
4The rankings for 2006-2009 are available at: http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/mba100/2009/full list/.
5The ranking is available at: http://www.topuniversities.com/worlduniversityrankings/results/2008/
overall rankings/top 100 universities/.
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average number of full-time job applications is 6.27 in the closed (costless) stage, and
2.12 in the open (costly) stage. The differences in applications between the costless and
costly stages for both types of search are significantly different than zero (p < 0.01). The
averages are computed across the entire sample of students, including those who did not
submit any application using the on-campus recruiting system.
When the exogenous probability of hiring increases, all else equal, more effort
is put into the search (
de∗
i
dλ
> 0).
To test this, I compare the search effort by candidates looking for jobs in good eco-
nomic times versus those recruiting in bad economic times, while keeping constant their
outside option (vi). Hence, I will analyze only those candidates that have a full-time offer
already that resulted from an internship or a prior full-time employer, and therefore face
a high, and relatively similar across people, outside option value vi. The only difference
then between the two groups of searchers is the value of λ they face: high for those
recruiting in good times, low for the others.
I find that in bad economic times (low λ), a higher fraction of those with an existing
full-time offer will accept it and will search little or not at all during the fall recruiting
season, compared to those searching in good times (high λ). As can be seen in Figure
2, 7% fewer students who have an offer already from an internship or a prior employer
go through the on-campus recruiting season for full-time jobs during bad economic con-
ditions (i.e., class of 2009) than during good economic conditions (i.e., class of 2007).
This difference is significantly different from zero (p < 0.05). Of the students with an
existing offer, members of class of 2007 apply on-campus to 5.98 jobs on average, whereas
members of class of 2009 apply to 5.03 jobs on average (the difference of the means is
significant from zero at p < 0.1). Hence, those with good outside options are less likely
to search any further in bad times, and more likely to simply take the outside option.
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As additional support for this prediction, Figure 3 shows that of the students with an
existing offer, 83.33% decide to accept it if they are part of the class of 2009 but only
63.18% accept it if they are part of the class of 2007. For the class of 2008, the outside
option acceptance rate is in between these values, at 76.25%. As implied by Proposition
1, these results therefore indicate that conditional on having a valuable outside option,
candidates put significantly less effort in their search in times when hiring is less likely,
i.e., when λ is smaller.
To complete this argument, it is necessary to show that it is indeed the case that
in bad economic times (fall 2008-spring 2009) λ is smaller, that is, the probability that
somebody is hired conditional on companies conducting recruiting is lower in bad times.
One way to verify whether λ is smaller in bad times is to look at the number of offer
per student. I find that the average number of offers per candidate is 1.51 for the class
of 2007, 1.37 for the class of 2008 and 0.99 for the class of 2009. The distribution of
the number of offers that students receive is presented in Figure 4. Consistent with the
result that the average number of full-time job offers per candidate is much lower for the
cohort recruiting in bad times (class of 2009) relative to that recruiting in good times
(class of 2007), Figure 4 shows that in bad times the fraction of candidates with two or
more offers is less than half than in good times, whereas the fraction of people with zero
or just one offer is significantly higher.
Note that bad economic times can mean both a lower λ, as well as a lower value of the
outside option vi. The overall effect of economic conditions on search effort is therefore
determined by the opposing influence of these two parameters.6 If λ is lower, effort is
not that productive and therefore search should be less intense. However, if vi is also
low, not searching leads for sure to a bad outside option, and this in turn can overcome
6This is why in testing whether effort increases with lambda, all else equal, I only used the sample
of people who have a valuable outside option, that is, those who have an outstanding full-time job offer
from a company they have worked for as interns or regular employees.
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the effect that a low λ has on search intensity. Hence, those candidates with bad outside
options, who are those without an existing offer from a prior workplace, may in fact
search with higher intensity if they are part of a cohort recruiting in bad times, relative
to those recruiting in good times. Confirming this prediction, I find that on average class
of 2007 students with no existing offers apply to 9.73 jobs, class of 2008 students apply
to 10.55 jobs, and class of 2009 students apply to 13.95 jobs during on-campus full-time
recruiting. These means are significantly different at p < 0.01.
When the value of the outside option is lower, all else equal, more effort is
put into the job search (
de∗
i
dvi
< 0).
As before, I identify full-time job candidates with better outside options as those
who have a full-time offer from a summer internship or a former employer. In Table 1
I estimate a probit model of the probability that a student will choose to participate in
the on-campus full-time recruiting process that occurs during the September-December
period each year. I include class fixed effects to account for the influence of economic
conditions at the time of recruiting on the search process. The results in Table 1 show
that individuals who have a full-time offer from a summer internship or from a former
full-time employer are 14%, and respectively 23%, less likely to participate in the on-
campus recruiting in the fall of their second year of MBA studies. Moreover, conditional
on going through on-campus recruiting for full-time jobs, candidates will apply to fewer
positions if they have an offer from an internship already, as indicated by the summary
statistics in Table 2. Those without an existing offer apply on average to 11 jobs, while
those with an offer from a prior work place apply to about 6 jobs.
In Table 3 I estimate OLS models for the number of applications sent by each student
separately for internships and full-time jobs, as well as for the industry concentration
index of these applications. I include as independent variables measures of outside option
14
value, as well as of the human capital of the candidate. I control for the industry that
the searcher seems most interested in, and include class fixed effects. In line with the
univariate results documented before, I find that candidates that have already a full-
time offer from an internship or a prior employer search less during the fall on-campus
recruiting process, in both the costless and the costly stage. Individuals with valuable
outside options apply to about four fewer jobs in the costless stage and two fewer jobs in
the costly stage compared to other candidates that have similar industry interests and
human capital, and are recruiting during the same economic conditions. Moreover, their
search is significantly more focused, as the industry concentration index of their portfolio
of applications is 10% higher than that of candidates without an outstanding full-time
offer.
As discussed earlier, it is likely that outside options of candidates going through full-
time job recruiting in bad economic times are worse than those of candidates recruiting
in good times. As a result, candidates have the incentive to put more effort in the
search process in bad times, even though the exogenous hiring probability λ may be
smaller then, to avoid being left with a low vi. I find that indeed, across all candidates
who chose to participate in on-campus recruiting for either internships or full-time jobs
(and therefore likely not to have valuable outside options), the search is broader in bad
economic times than in good times, as shown be the evidence in Table 4. The average
number of internship applications per student is 20 for class of 2007, and 23 for class
of 2010, while the industry concentration index drops from 0.72 to 0.65. Hence, even
looking at searches for internships, the overall effect of tough economic conditions is an
increase in the number of applications and in the diversity of industries a candidate is
willing to consider. Table 4 also documents similar effects for the case of searching for
full-time jobs.
As a further test of the prediction that those with worse outside options will put more
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effort in recruiting, I analyze the bids submitted by candidates interested in winning
interviews during the open stage of recruiting. Arguably, those who are still bidding for
interviews in later rounds have not yet received acceptable offers, and therefore face worse
outside options than those bidding in earlier rounds. This effect is indeed seen in the
data. Figure 5 shows that those still bidding in late stages of the recruiting process spend
significantly more points per bid than those bidding in earlier stages. Note, however, that
this can simply be the result of approaching the end game, that is, the end of bidding,
when points become useless. I will return to this point later in the subsection.
Lower types will put more effort into the search that higher types if they
need the job more (e2 > e1 ⇐⇒ v2 − v2 > v1 − v1).
As argued earlier, empirical evidence in extant papers supports the idea that lower
ability people have much more to gain from getting the job, since their outside option
is worse than that of higher types. For instance, Oreopoulos et al. (2006) shows that
low ability workers are those who are hurt most in recessions, and Kuhnen (2009) shows
that, unconditionally, lower ability applicants get employed in worse jobs in terms of
seniority and pay, than high ability applicants. Hence, the prediction of the model is that
lower ability individuals will search harder. The results in the OLS regression models
in Table 3 are consistent with this prediction. Higher ability candidates, as measured
by their graduate school GPA or the prestige of the undergraduate degree institution
they attended, apply to fewer positions in both the closed and open recruiting stages and
have a higher industry concentration index than lower ability candidates.7 For instance,
increasing a candidate’s GPA by 1 point (out of 4 possible) leads to a decrease of about
7Controlling for GPA and the prestige of the undergraduate institution attended, the candidate’s
GMAT score is positively correlated with the number of internship applications. However, if I estimate
a similar model as that in Table 3 and only include the GMAT score as the proxy of the candidate’s
ability (so without the GPA variable on the right-hand side) I find that a higher GMAT score leads to
a more focused search.
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4 applications for either internships or full-time jobs, for both the costless and costly
recruiting stages, and to an increase in the industry concentration index of the portfolio
of applications of 4% for internships and 7% for full-time jobs. I do not find a significant
effect of the candidates’ seniority in the job held prior to starting graduate school and
the breadth of their search.
While data items such as the GPA, GMAT score or the prestige of the undergraduate
institution attended are proxies for the general human capital of the individual, industry-
or firm-specific human capital is also important for getting the job. In the context of
the model, the parameter θ encompasses the overall fit of the candidate for the job,
which depends on his general as well as his industry- or firm-specific human capital. To
test whether the latter component is also a driver of search breadth, as the model would
predict, in the regressions in Table 3 I include a dummy variable for whether the candidate
is an industry switcher. This indicator takes the value of one if the person searches
mainly in a broad industry that is not the same as the broad industry they worked in
right before enrolling in the MBA program. The six broad industry categories that I
assign companies to are Consulting, Finance, General Corporations, Government/Non-
profit, Other Services (which mainly include law firms) and Technology. For example,
an individual with a background in Consulting who dedicates the highest number of his
applications to Finance jobs is categorized as an industry switcher. A person can be
an industry switcher during the internship search, but may be a non-switcher during the
full-time job search if during that process they apply mainly to jobs in the broad industry
they came from when they started the MBA degree. The opposite can also happen. If
the person is not engaged in on-campus job search, I characterize them as a switcher or
non-switcher by comparing the broad industry of the job they accepted to that of the
job they had right before starting graduate school.8
8This can happen, for instance, if the student has a full-time offer from a summer internship and
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Using the notation of the model, an industry switcher has a lower value of ability
or fit with the job θ, compared to a non-switcher. Therefore, the model predicts that
industry switching candidates will conduct a broader search than non-switchers.9 The
results of the regression models in Table 3 are consistent with this prediction. Switchers
apply to two more internship positions, and to one more full-time position than non-
switchers, and have an industry concentration index that is between 3% and 5% lower.
These differences are statistically significant at conventional levels.
When the value of the job is higher, more effort is put into the job search
(
de∗
i
dvi
> 0).
Some jobs are more coveted than others, that is, they have a higher value of vi.
For instance, it is arguably better to start one’s post-MBA career by joining a more
prestigious firm, as this offers better opportunities in terms of career mobility. At the
same time, a job that offers more responsibility and higher pay is likely to be seen as more
valuable. Hence, the model would predict that candidates will expend more effort when
a more prestigious or better paid job is at stake. This prediction is in fact confirmed by
the bidding behavior of students in the open stage of recruiting for both internships and
full-time jobs, as seen in the regression models in Table 5. Bids placed for interviews with
prestigious companies are 71 points higher than those for non-prestigious companies in
the case of internships, and 95 points higher in the case of full-time jobs. If the average
starting salary in the company providing the interview is $10,000 higher, bids will be 16
points higher for internships, and 10 points higher in the case of full-time jobs.
In these regressions I include broad industry fixed effects, as well as fixed effects for
chooses not to do the on-campus recruiting in the fall of their second year of study.
9Note that in the context of the model industry switchers will search more than non-switchers if
switchers have a lower value of job fit or ability θ, or a lower value vi of the outside option. It is possible
that switchers do not like their outside option that much (this is why they wish to change industries
rather than going back to the industry they had prior to graduate school), and value highly getting a
job in a new industry.
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the round when the bid is placed to account for time trends in the value assigned to jobs,
since those bidding in late rounds likely have a low outside option and nothing to lose
by spending all their points. I find that the highest bids are those placed for interviews
in the Consulting industry. Moreover, confirming the univariate findings in Figure 5,
bids increase significantly from round to round. Bids placed in round five are on average
almost 150 points higher than bids placed in round one. As discussed earlier, this result
can be interpreted as either indicating that those participating in later rounds are more
“desperate” since the end of recruiting season is nearer, or as simply saying that saving
points for later is less valuable towards the end of recruiting. The bid regression model
for full-time job interviews in Table 5 also shows that those that have an offer already
from a prior workplace place on average higher bids that the other candidates. This
effect is consistent with the results documented earlier that students who have an offer
already but choose to participate in on-campus recruiting for full-time jobs will apply
to fewer positions. Since they will bid for fewer interview slots, then the average bid of
these candidate with a valuable outside option is bound to be higher.
As additional evidence that more effort is put into job search if the value of getting
the job is higher, I find that when applying for internships, candidates are significantly
broader in their search than when applying to full-time positions. This effect can be seen
for instance in Table 4. Arguably, applying to more internships allows the candidate to
explore and learn about more companies or industries. This exploratory behavior embeds
an option-like payoff, more so than what one would get by applying to a full-time job
a year later. Note that this empirical pattern can also be driven by
de∗
i
dc
< 0, that is,
recruiting for internships may be less costly, but this is a doubtful assertion. Candidates
have to network and prepare for interviews in both situations, and thus the marginal cost
of effort could easily be the same for both internships and full-time recruiting.
An alternative explanation for why candidates apply to more internships than full-
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time positions is that there may be more numerous relevant internship positions available
to a student than full-time jobs. The data allow me to distinguish between this explana-
tion of search based on changes in the available set of interesting jobs, and the one based
on the existence of an embedded option-like payoff in internship search. If candidates
apply to fewer full-time jobs than internships because there are fewer interesting full-time
jobs to compete for, this does not predict that full-time applications will be more or less
concentrated in a particular industry compared to internship applications. However, if
the change in search is due to a difference in the value of internships versus full-time
jobs, with internships having the additional option payoff of exploring new areas, then
we expect to see workers be more likely to apply to industries different from their back-
ground during the internship search than during the full-time job search. To test this
prediction, I compare the industry switching behavior of all students during both intern-
ship and full-time recruiting. The fraction of candidates in class of 2007, 2008 and 2009
who are classified as industry switchers during internship recruiting is 63.43%, whereas
for full-time job recruiting the fraction of switchers is only 52.80%. This decrease in
industry switching behavior of about 10% between the two stages of recruiting is also
present within each of the three classes, thus alleviating concerns that it may be just be
driven by changes in the economic environment faced by the cohorts studied here. The
evidence therefore indicates that candidates are indeed more likely to search outside the
industry they came from when joining the MBA program during internship recruiting
than during recruiting for full-time jobs, as the model would predict.
4.2 Choosing where to apply: Tests of Proposition 2
Candidates will tend to apply to jobs for which they are better qualified (i.e.,
for which they have a higher value of θ) and that they find more valuable
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(i.e., that have a higher value of vi).
Proposition 2 implies that there should be a correlation between the type of courses
taken (e.g., Finance versus Technology) or extracurricular activities pursued (e.g., mem-
bership in the IBanking club or the BioTech club) and what type of job the student will
apply to. If a student takes more Finance courses and belongs to more Finance-related
clubs on campus, for instance, this suggests that he is more prepared for Finance jobs
than others and therefore has a higher θ in the contest for Finance jobs, but also, that
he values working in this industry more than his competitors.
As expected, I find that the type of job a candidate will apply to is predicted by the
type of classes he takes, and his on-campus club memberships, as indicated by him being
on these club’s email lists. These effects are illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. For instance,
individuals who apply to jobs in Finance take more Finance classes and are members of
more Finance clubs on campus, than individuals who apply to jobs in other industries.
Similar patterns hold for job applicants to consulting positions, government/non-profit
positions, technology or general corporation positions (e.g., consumer goods/marketing).
While Proposition 2 states that people will prefer to compete for jobs they value more,
it is important to keep in mind that this result refers to the choice made by a candidate
between two job contests keeping the same across contests the relative ability of the
candidate (his θ in each contest) and his competitors’ valuation of the job (vj−vj , j 6= i).
A question that arises naturally, then, is how candidates choose contests in situations
when a higher vi also implies a higher vj , j 6= i, for instance, when all applicants prefer a
job with higher salary over one with lower salary. For instance, one may inquire whether
it is the case that those students with high ability apply to jobs in high paying industries,
and those with low ability apply to jobs in industries characterized by lower wages. In
these cases, equilibria may arise where for both the low paying job as well as for the
high paying job the set of competitors will be a mix of high and low ability types. The
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intuition of this result is that competing head-to-head for a well-paid job with another
applicant with high ability has a low chance of success, whereas competing with a low
ability candidate for a low paying job has a much higher chance of leading to an offer. It
is possible, therefore, that in expectation one is better off choosing to compete against
weaker adversaries for a low value outcome, than choosing to apply for a more coveted
job. Hence, the model does not have an unconditional prediction whether there should be
a positive correlation between ability and the salary or prestige of the jobs people apply
to, or, in other words, that only high types apply to the best jobs. For certain regions
of the parameter space (if, for instance, the high paid jobs are much more valuable to
high types than the low paid jobs), it is possible to have positive assortative selection
of types into contests, whereas for other regions the types will be uniformly distributed
across contests.
The evidence presented in Table 6 shows that in fact there is some self-selection into
contests based on ability. I focus on contest choices made during the costly, open bid
stage of recruiting, when candidates must bid points to try to win an interview time slot
for a particular job, but similar effects are seen in contests involving costless applications.
I find that a significantly higher number of candidates participate in contests for jobs in
higher paying companies (defined as those paying average starting salaries over $100,000
to individuals in the data set) or more prestigious ones, and candidates bid on average
more points in these contests. Contests for jobs in high paying companies attract pools
of candidates that not only are more numerous than those participating in contests for
low paying jobs, as measured by the number of applicants per job offer, but also are
of higher average quality as measured by GPA or the GMAT score. However, I do not
find any significant differences between the average ability of those bidding for jobs in
prestigious versus non-prestigious companies. These results complement the findings
in Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, & Parent (2005), who develop and estimate empirically a
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model of wage and sector choice when comparative advantage and learning coexist in the
labor market. In their model a worker’s skills determine the worker’s current wage and
employment sector. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth Gibbons
et al. (2005) find that high-wage sectors (e.g. finance, business services) employ high-
skill workers and offer high returns to workers’ skills. My results show that one channel
through which this effect occurs is the self-selection of higher types into higher-paying
jobs, from the beginning of these individuals’ post-MBA career.
As indicated by the statistics presented in Table 6, I find that there are gender effects
in contest selection. The fraction of bids for interviews submitted from men is 72% in the
case of high paying companies, and only 65% for low paying ones. Therefore, men are
more likely to compete in contests for better paid jobs, whereas women are more likely
to apply to lower paid positions. This result complements earlier findings regarding the
existence of a gender wage gap later in the careers of MBA graduates (Bertrand, Goldin,
& Katz (2008)). While self-selection into jobs could drive this gender wage gap, as my
results would suggest, another cause could be that during their career women are less
likely to renegotiate salaries (Babcock & Laschever (2003)).
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes and tests empirically a simple model of allocation of effort during
workers’ search for jobs, with the goal of understanding the determinants of the supply of
human capital that firms face when making hiring decisions. I use a novel data set that
contains detailed information about the search strategies and labor market outcomes of
more than 2,000 MBA graduates from a top U.S. business school. I find that candidates
competing for employment increase their job search effort if the cost of effort is lower,
the likelihood that firms will hire increases, their outside option is worse, the job sought
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is more valuable, or if their ability is lower. Candidates apply to positions for which they
are better qualified, while higher ability types are more likely to choose to participate in
contests for higher paying jobs. There also exist a gender effect, with men being more
likely to compete in contests for better paid positions. The main contribution of the paper
is to bring forward detailed evidence regarding the job search strategies of participants
in an important segment of the labor market, therefore improving our understanding of
the formation of the pool of human capital that firms can recruit from. These results,
together with those in the companion paper (Kuhnen (2009)), shed light on the process of
matching firms and human capital, which is a critical driver of productivity and economic
growth.
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Table 1: Who applies for full-time jobs on campus?
Probit model of the choice to participate in the on-campus recruiting process for full time
jobs, occurring at the beginning of the second year of the MBA program (September-
December). Marginal effects are reported.
OnCampus
FTJobSearcheri
GotOfferFromInternshipi –0.14
(–6.32)∗∗∗
GotOfferFromPrevFTEmployeri –0.23
(–5.71)∗∗∗
Constant
Pseudo R2 0.05
Observations 1407
Class year FEs included
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 2: Search intensity and types of offers
This table shows the number of full-time jobs candidates apply to during on-campus
recruiting as a function of their available options for full-time placement.
Number of full-time
Available job applications
options GPA (on-campus recruiting)
Candidate has full-time offer
from prior full-time employer 3.57 5.86
(unconstrained)
Candidate has full-time offer
from internship obtained on campus 3.53 5.33
Candidate has full-time offer
from internship obtained off campus 3.47 6.43
Candidate does not have offers
from internships or prior employers 3.39 11.35
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Table 3: Determinants of search effort
The table presents OLS regression models predicting the number of applications sent by candidates in the closed and
open stages, for both internships and full-time jobs, as well as the industry concentration of these applications. For
instance, an industry concentration index of 1 means that the candidate sent all applications to jobs in one industry. An
index of 0.6 indicates that the candidate sent 60% of applications to jobs in a particular industry, while the remaining
40% were sent to positions in other industries.
Industry Industry
#Applications #Applications Concentration #Applications #Applications Concentration
InternshipsClosedi Internships
Open
i InternApplicationsi FTJobs
Closed
i FTJobs
Open
i FTApplicationsi
GPAi –2.80 –1.18 0.04 –3.09 –1.61 0.07
(–2.90)∗∗∗ (–3.64)∗∗∗ (2.05)∗∗ (–3.29)∗∗∗ (–4.53)∗∗∗ (2.96)∗∗∗
GMATi/100 3.09 1.23 –0.02 –0.03 0.24 0.02
(4.51)∗∗∗ (5.40)∗∗∗ (–1.48) (–0.05) (1.06) (1.21)
Top100Undergradi –0.26 0.05 0.02 –1.19 –0.51 0.02
(–0.48) (0.26) (2.03)∗∗ (–2.59)∗∗∗ (–2.91)∗∗∗ (1.61)
Seniorityi –0.98 –0.97 –0.02 0.57 0.24 –0.02
(–0.82) (–2.43)∗∗ (–0.86) (0.55) (0.61) (–0.91)
IndustrySwitcher 1.35 0.59 –0.05
InternshipSearchi (2.43)
∗∗ (3.19)∗∗∗ (–4.97)∗∗∗
GotOffer –4.36 –1.74 0.09
FromInternshipi (–9.26)
∗∗∗ (–9.74)∗∗∗ (7.16)∗∗∗
GotOffer –4.14 –1.32 0.11
FromPrevFTEmployeri (–5.76)
∗∗∗ (–4.87)∗∗∗ (6.07)∗∗∗
IndustrySwitcher 0.72 0.37 –0.03
FullT imeSearchi (1.55) (2.11)
∗∗ (–2.50)∗∗
Searchingfor –2.60 0.24 0.15 –1.30 –0.29 0.05
FINC (–3.52)∗∗∗ (0.98) (11.03)∗∗∗ (–2.20)∗∗ (–1.31) (3.27)∗∗∗
Searchingfor 4.34 1.04 0.05 0.18 0.11 –0.04
GENCORP (6.30)∗∗∗ (4.51)∗∗∗ (4.18)∗∗∗ (0.30) (0.47) (–2.26)∗∗
Searchingfor –13.99 –3.85 0.30 –6.59 –1.72 0.21
GOV NONP (–4.77)∗∗∗ (–3.94)∗∗∗ (5.58)∗∗∗ (–1.78)∗ (–1.23) (2.12)∗∗
Searchingfor –14.96 –4.05 0.20 –7.84 –1.85 –0.05
OTHERSERV ICES (–2.32)∗∗ (–1.89)∗ (1.74)∗ (–1.64) (–1.02) (–0.37)
Searchingfor –0.60 0.52 0.05 0.04 0.64 –0.02
TECH (–0.71) (1.84)∗ (3.12)∗∗∗ (0.05) (2.27)∗∗ (–1.25)
Constant –0.47 –0.21 0.69 20.30 7.25 0.35
(–0.10) (–0.14) (8.27)∗∗∗ (4.80)∗∗∗ (4.53)∗∗∗ (3.15)∗∗∗
R2 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.12
Observations 1841 1843 1856 1315 1316 1319
Class year FEs included
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 4: Search breadth by job type and class year.
All students who participated in on-campus interviews are included.
Internships Full-Time Jobs
All students Average number of applications per student
applying for both 22.14 12.83
internships and
full-time jobs Average industry concentration index
via on-campus 0.70 0.72
interviews
Internships Full-Time Jobs
Average number of applications per student
Class of 2007 20.45 13.30
Class of 2008 21.76 13.89
Class of 2009 20.14 17.27
Class of 2010 23.01 N/A
Average industry concentration index
Class of 2007 0.72 0.72
Class of 2008 0.70 0.75
Class of 2009 0.72 0.68
Class of 2010 0.65 N/A
29
Table 5: Bidding behavior
The table presents OLS regression models for the bids placed by candidates interested in
obtaining interview slots during the open stage of on-campus recruiting for internships
and full-time jobs. Each year students get 800 points to bid for interviews they are
interested in obtaining. Points do not carry to the following year. The omitted industry
category is Consulting. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered
at the job id level.
Bids for Bids for
Internships Full-time Jobs
PrestigiousCompany 71.17 95.05
(10.18)∗∗∗ (6.05)∗∗∗
AverageCompanySalary (thousand$′s) 1.56 0.97
(3.59)∗∗∗ (2.07)∗∗
Second Round of Bidding 24.45 20.42
(2.78)∗∗∗ (0.97)
Third Round of Bidding 88.69 70.38
(6.41)∗∗∗ (3.81)∗∗∗
Fourth Round of Bidding 110.31 144.04
(5.60)∗∗∗ (6.05)∗∗∗
Fifth Round of Bidding 147.30 149.02
(3.66)∗∗∗ (4.00)∗∗∗
FINC Industry –36.06 –65.08
(–2.51)∗∗ (–2.51)∗∗
GENCORP Industry –42.42 –95.54
(–2.84)∗∗∗ (–3.70)∗∗∗
GOVNONP Industry –45.49 –149.14
(–1.29) (–3.21)∗∗∗
OTHERSERV ICES Industry –40.71 –101.60
(–1.68)∗ (–3.38)∗∗∗
TECH Industry –80.87 –131.67
(–5.83)∗∗∗ (–4.49)∗∗∗
GotOfferFromInternshipi 64.66
(6.36)∗∗∗
GotOfferFromPrevFTEmployeri 37.24
(2.23)∗∗
R2 0.12 0.15
Observations 8883 5720
Class year FEs included
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
30
Table 6: Selection into contests
This table shows the average characteristics of applicants as a function of the desirability of the job pursued in the
contest. The data refers to open-bid contests. A contest is given by the triplet (company, recruiting year, job type),
where job type is either internship or full-time. Whether a company is categorized as high paying or low paying is
determined by whether the average full-time job salary offered to candidates during the sample period is above $100,000.
Using this threshold 46% of companies are categorized as high paying. Prestigious companies are those named in the
Fortune MBA 100 annual listings during 2006-2009. 11% of companies that make offers to candidates in the sample
(including those recruiting off-campus) are classified as prestigious.
High Low Non-
Paying Paying Prestigious Prestigious
Companies Companies Diff Companies Companies Diff
#Applicants 17.55 13.67 3.88∗∗∗ 22.22 10.34 11.88∗∗∗
#Interviews/Applicant 0.77 0.74 0.03∗∗∗ 0.75 0.75 0.00
#Offers/Applicant 0.05 0.06 -0.01∗∗∗ 0.05 0.05 0.00
#Offers/Interview 0.07 0.10 -0.03∗∗ 0.08 0.09 -0.01∗
Points bid 131.28 110.47 20.81∗∗∗ 151.50 95.86 55.64∗∗∗
GPA 3.46 3.42 0.03∗∗∗ 3.43 3.44 -0.01
GMAT 701.99 696.29 5.70∗∗∗ 699.00 698.03 0.97
Top100Undergrad 0.42 0.47 -0.05∗∗∗ 0.45 0.45 0.00
Male 0.72 0.65 0.07∗∗∗ 0.67 0.68 0.01
# Contests 361 606 389 578
∗∗∗ Significant at p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Breadth and cost of search
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Figure 2: Histogram of the number of full-time job applications made by candidates, by
year of graduation
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Figure 3: Histogram of decisions to accept or reject the outside option (i.e., an existing
offer from a summer internship or a prior full time employer), by year of graduation
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Figure 4: Histogram of the number of offers received by candidates, by year of graduation
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Figure 5: Bidding behavior by round
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Figure 6: GPA and number of classes taken, by academic area and type of job applied
for.
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Figure 7: Listserve memberships by industry area and type of job applied for.
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